Deterrence vs Retributivism
This paper will be discussing whether deterrence or retributivism is a better justification for punishment. I will be arguing that deterrence is a better justification through a mixture of utilitarianism and kantianism.
The basic issue is this: Punishment is intrinsically something that needs to be justified. One can’t just go around locking people up, or fining them, or making them clean interstate highways without any reason. The two common justifications for punishment are deterrence and retribution. Deterrence says that through punishment, crime is deterred, and is therefore justified. Retributivism says that punishment is justified because criminals deserve to be punished and that society has an obligation to do so.
Deterrence is derived from a strongly utilitarian point of view. It is what is the greatest good for the greatest number of people. The ciminal gets the least amount of punishment that is still effective to preventing crime, and the people get to live in a state of reduced crime and wrongdoing because it is being effectively deterred. It says that crime must be deterred, and so the evil of punishment is justified. The problem with utilitarian deterrence is that it justifies punishment only through the greater good of all, and so does not require that the people who are punished are guilty and in fact requires that innocent people be punished if it would result in a greater good. I think this is wrong.
Retributivism is Kant’s justification for punishment and it functions on a premise that guilty people must be punished for their wrongdoings. It avoids the pitfall of utilitarianism punishing the innocent because, obviously, you can’t exact retribution on someone who hasn’t done anything wrong. The problem I have with it is that I don’t feel that responding to wrongdoings with something that is itself bad is the moral way to go about things. I don’t think that people have the right to decide who deserves what. To say that someone deserves to have their freedoms stripped away is to deny that they are people at all. To me, an important point isn’t whether or not people deserve anything, because I think that saying someone deserves something unpleasant is a somewhat sadistic outlook, but whether or not anyone has the right to punish others. I don’t think people should have the right to take others’ rights or inflict pain or unhappiness. Personal liberties end when they start tromping all over other people’s personal liberties, and the only way for someone to gain the ability to punish others is if they have to to deter further misdeeds. No one must punish someone as retribution, but it is certainly plausible that someone must punish someone as a deterrent. I think Kant is on the right track with his view that there are things that are right and things that are just wrong. Things that are wrong are always wrong, no matter the circumstances. Sometimes the lesser evil must be chosen, but that doesn’t make it good, just better than the alternative. So I am confused when Kant then insists that things that are morally wrong (punishment) be done when there is no apparent reason. Say a little kid lied about who ate the last cookie and the guardian didn’t find out until a few weeks later. There is no way that the kid is going to remember eating the cookie, let alone lying about it, but Kant would say that the guardian must punish the kid because he did something wrong. I don’t think there is any reason to do it, it just adding more bad to the world. Another rather good example of the difference between deterrence and retributivism is the death penalty. It has been shown that in countries where the death penalty is abolished there are fewer of what we would consider capitol crimes. So obviously the death penalty is not a deterrent to others who would commit capitol crimes, because if it were the rate of capitol crimes would increase dramatically upon the abolishing of the death penalty. Life in prison is just as effective of a deterrent as death to the actual criminal because either way he or she is never going to be able to commit the crime again. And so the question becomes whether or not that person deserves to die for their crime. I say no. I think that as long as further crime is effectively deterred, there is absolutely no reason or justification for more extreme measures of punishment, and in fact think that further punishment is wrong. Just flat out, it is wrong to kill people, so when it can be avoided, it should be. That isn’t the greatest good for the greatest number of people, it is knowing the difference between right and wrong and choosing what is right over the wrong. What Kant supposedly wants. So I choose the middle road. Punish people only as a deterrent, but also only when they are actually guilty. Punish as lightly and as rarely as possible. The ethical high ground in this instance is simply to do the least amount of harm that will still result in the desired good, without compromising established moral truths.
The basic issue is this: Punishment is intrinsically something that needs to be justified. One can’t just go around locking people up, or fining them, or making them clean interstate highways without any reason. The two common justifications for punishment are deterrence and retribution. Deterrence says that through punishment, crime is deterred, and is therefore justified. Retributivism says that punishment is justified because criminals deserve to be punished and that society has an obligation to do so.
Deterrence is derived from a strongly utilitarian point of view. It is what is the greatest good for the greatest number of people. The ciminal gets the least amount of punishment that is still effective to preventing crime, and the people get to live in a state of reduced crime and wrongdoing because it is being effectively deterred. It says that crime must be deterred, and so the evil of punishment is justified. The problem with utilitarian deterrence is that it justifies punishment only through the greater good of all, and so does not require that the people who are punished are guilty and in fact requires that innocent people be punished if it would result in a greater good. I think this is wrong.
Retributivism is Kant’s justification for punishment and it functions on a premise that guilty people must be punished for their wrongdoings. It avoids the pitfall of utilitarianism punishing the innocent because, obviously, you can’t exact retribution on someone who hasn’t done anything wrong. The problem I have with it is that I don’t feel that responding to wrongdoings with something that is itself bad is the moral way to go about things. I don’t think that people have the right to decide who deserves what. To say that someone deserves to have their freedoms stripped away is to deny that they are people at all. To me, an important point isn’t whether or not people deserve anything, because I think that saying someone deserves something unpleasant is a somewhat sadistic outlook, but whether or not anyone has the right to punish others. I don’t think people should have the right to take others’ rights or inflict pain or unhappiness. Personal liberties end when they start tromping all over other people’s personal liberties, and the only way for someone to gain the ability to punish others is if they have to to deter further misdeeds. No one must punish someone as retribution, but it is certainly plausible that someone must punish someone as a deterrent. I think Kant is on the right track with his view that there are things that are right and things that are just wrong. Things that are wrong are always wrong, no matter the circumstances. Sometimes the lesser evil must be chosen, but that doesn’t make it good, just better than the alternative. So I am confused when Kant then insists that things that are morally wrong (punishment) be done when there is no apparent reason. Say a little kid lied about who ate the last cookie and the guardian didn’t find out until a few weeks later. There is no way that the kid is going to remember eating the cookie, let alone lying about it, but Kant would say that the guardian must punish the kid because he did something wrong. I don’t think there is any reason to do it, it just adding more bad to the world. Another rather good example of the difference between deterrence and retributivism is the death penalty. It has been shown that in countries where the death penalty is abolished there are fewer of what we would consider capitol crimes. So obviously the death penalty is not a deterrent to others who would commit capitol crimes, because if it were the rate of capitol crimes would increase dramatically upon the abolishing of the death penalty. Life in prison is just as effective of a deterrent as death to the actual criminal because either way he or she is never going to be able to commit the crime again. And so the question becomes whether or not that person deserves to die for their crime. I say no. I think that as long as further crime is effectively deterred, there is absolutely no reason or justification for more extreme measures of punishment, and in fact think that further punishment is wrong. Just flat out, it is wrong to kill people, so when it can be avoided, it should be. That isn’t the greatest good for the greatest number of people, it is knowing the difference between right and wrong and choosing what is right over the wrong. What Kant supposedly wants. So I choose the middle road. Punish people only as a deterrent, but also only when they are actually guilty. Punish as lightly and as rarely as possible. The ethical high ground in this instance is simply to do the least amount of harm that will still result in the desired good, without compromising established moral truths.
posted by Rachael Ferber at 9:52 PM
0 comments
